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Network processor (NP) is optimized to performnetwork
tasks. It uses massive parallel processing architecture to
achieve high performance. Ad hoc network is an exciting
research aspect due to the characters of self-organization,
dynamically topology and temporary network life. How-
ever, all the characters make the security problem more
serious. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is the main
puzzle in the security of Ad hoc network. A novel
NP-based security scheme is proposed to combat the
attack. Security agent is established by a hardware thread
in NP. Agent can update itself at some interval by the
trustworthiness of the neighbor nodes. Agent can trace
the RREQ and RREP messages stream to aggregate the
key information and analyze them by intrusion detection
algorithm. NS2 simulator is expanded to validate the
security scheme. Simulation results show that NP-based
security scheme is effective to detect DoS attack.
Keywords: network processor, AODV routing proto-
col, security Agent, DoS attack, intrusion detection,
performance evaluation.
1. Introduction
With the ever-increasing performance and flex-
ibility requirements seen in today’s networks,
programmable network processors have been
developed to meet the need. Network proces-
sor(NP) is a programmable device with archi-
tectural parallel features and special optimiza-
tion for packet processing[1]. Most network
processors use hardware multithreading com-
puting model. Separate register files and con-
texts for separate threads ensure fast context
switching. The multithreading parallel archi-
tectures fit to multi-task execution environment
in network. Thus each thread is related to a
task. New general programmable routers are
designed by network processor, especially for
security application.
Ad hoc networks are dynamic collections of
self-organizing mobile nodes with links that are
changing in an unpredictable way. They are
characterized by a dynamic topology. Nodes
can perform the roles of both hosts and routers
with intrinsic mutual trust. In Ad hoc network,
every node acts as router to form the network,
security is very important to ad hoc networks. In
wirelessAdhoc network, wireless nodes require
process flexibility with low power consumption
and high security, network processor is very fit
to the need. So we use network processor to
build the node of Ad hoc security scheme is
designed by the network processor.
2. Related Research Work
There are two main approaches in current Ad
hoc securing environments. The first is intru-
sion prevention measures, such as authentica-
tion and encryption. The second is intrusion
detection and response approach [2].
Because cryptography-based prevention tech-
nique consumes much energy, it is invalid to
internal attacks [3]. Intrusion detection and re-
sponse are a necessity in MANET.We introduce
them by the system architecture.
1) Zhang and Lee build on the completely dis-
tributed structure of wireless Ad hoc net-
works. Every node in the network partic-
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ipates in the process of intrusion detection
[4]. Each node is responsible for detecting
intrusion locally and independently based on
the data collected by itself. They use data
on the node’s physical movements and the
corresponding change in its routing table as
the trace data to build the anomaly detection
model.
Because all the nodes run local detection engine
that analyzes local data for anomalies, it is too
expensive to detect some special attacks.
2) Hierarchical IDS architectures have been
proposed for multi-layered [5], wireless Ad
hoc networks. In a multilayered wireless Ad
hoc network, cluster-head nodes centralize
routing for the cluster and may support addi-
tional security mechanisms. The whole net-
work is logically divided into several clus-
ters, each of them consists of one special
node as the cluster head and several normal
nodes as the cluster members.
Because the cluster heads are the main commu-
nication and intrusion detection center, if the
cluster heads have been attacked by malicious
attackers, the network will be destroyed.
3) Oleg Kachirski proposes Multiple Sensors
intrusion detection system for Ad hoc wire-
less networks based on mobile agent tech-
nology [6]. They introduce a multi-sensor
intrusion detection system employing coop-
erative detection algorithm. A mobile agent
implementation is chosen, to support such
features of the IDS system as mobility of
sensors, intelligent routing of intrusion data
throughout the network and lightweight im-
plementation.
Because of scarce computational and power re-
sources in mobile nodes, multiple sensors and
agent communication impose heavy pressure on
Ad hoc network.
3. The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (AODV) Protocol
The Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) algorithm enables dynamic, self-start-
ing, multi-hop routing between participating
mobile nodes wishing to establish and maintain
an Ad hoc network [7]. AODV allows mobile
nodes to obtain routes quickly for new desti-
nations and does not require nodes to maintain
routes to destinations that are not in active com-
munication. AODV is a reactive and stateless
protocol that establishes routes only as desired
by a source node using route request (RREQ)
and route reply (RREP) messages. When a
source node wants to send data packets to a
destination node, but cannot find a route in its
routing table, it broadcasts RREQ messages to
its neighbors. Its neighbors then rebroadcast
the RREQ message to their neighbors if they do
not have a fresh enough route to the destination
node. This process continues until the RREQ
message reaches the destination node or an in-
termediate node that has a fresh enough route.
After accepting a RREQ message, the desti-
nation or intermediate node updates its reverse
route to the source node using the neighbor from
which it has received theRREQmessage. When
the source or an intermediate node receives a
RREP message, it updates its forward route to
the destination node, using the neighbor from
which it has received the RREP message. The
source node, or an intermediate node, updates
its routing table if it receives a RREP message.
4. Denial-of-Service Attack to AODV
Protocol
A “denial-of-service” attack is characterized by
an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent le-
gitimate users of a service from using that ser-
vice. It can consume scarce resources or de-
stroy network connection. These attacks do
not necessarily damage data directly or perma-
nently, but they intentionally compromise the
availability of the resources [8]. They can con-
sume much useful resource to disrupt network
usability. DoS attacks in AODV protocol rout-
ing level can be classified into two categories by
the type of message – RREQ flood attack and
RREP route loop attack.
4.1. RREQ Flood Attack
The flood attack introduces unnecessary broad-
cast messages into the network to hinder normal
operation of the network, the malicious node
continually sends a mass of route requests to
force the neighbors to process these packets and
therefore consume batteries and network band-
width. RREQ flood attack is shown in Figure
1.
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a) flood attack by malicious node.
b) after RREQ flood attack.
Fig. 1. Flooding attack caused by RREQ flood.
As shown in Figure 1, malicious node sends a
mass of fake RREQ broadcast to flood the net-
work. Other nodes process and response the
flood RREQ, the flood makes great impact on
the storage and communication resource of the
nodes. It almost causes the network communi-
cation breakdown.
4.2. RREP Route Loop Attack
A routing loop is a path that goes through the
same nodemore than once. Routing loops cause
packets to be sent by the same nodes over and
over again until the TTL-field in the packet is
exhausted to zero. Routing loops can be used
to create DoS, because they consume node re-
sources in the loop. The destination node can
also be isolated from the network, because only
few packets reach their destination. Figure 2
shows that a route loop is formed between node
1 and node 2.
As Figure 2 shows, there are two intermediate
nodes in a route from node S to node D. The at-
tacker can form a route loop between node 1 and
node 2, by pretending to be node 1 to forward a
RREP message with increased RREP sequence.
When node 2 receives the fake RREP message,
it updates the next hop from node D to node 1.
After updating the destination sequence number
a) before loop attack.
b) after loop attack
(Node S: originating node; nodes 1 and 2: intermediate
nodes; node D: destination node; node A: attack node).
Fig. 2. The attacker forms a loop between node 1 and
node 2 by a fake RREP message.
in the route table, these packets will be first sent
to node 1, then node 2 and back to node 1 again.
As a result, a route loop is formed between node
1 and node 2.
5. NP-based Security Scheme
in Ad hoc Network
Recently, main attention has been paid to the
security processor design for wireless Ad hoc
devices. However, there is a lack of research
for combining security application and network
processor in wireless communication. In this
paper, we present the design of security agent
by network processor to meet the security need
of wireless Ad hoc network. Ad hoc networks
are characterized by dynamic topology and the
lack of fixed infrastructure. Ad hoc wireless
networks allow people to set up computer net-
works and access information at any place and
time. Nodes can perform the roles of both hosts
and routers with intrinsic mutual trust. The na-
ture of mobile computing environment makes it
vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Traditionally, security processing has been
achieved using software. However, due to
the increasing demand for securing informa-
tion, software solution may not be the best
choice. The reason is that security algorithms
are very time consuming and require power-
ful computational ability. Multithreading and
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Fig. 3. NP-based distributed Wireless Ad hoc network.
programmable NP is used to establish mobile
node in out security scheme. It can execute
multi-task, such as routing tables management,
packet classification and forwarding, security
computation. Most of security processors exist-
ing in today’s market are designed to function as
security co-processors. Security co-processor
is attached to network processor and invoked
whenever the host processor decides that se-
curity processing is needed [9]. The approach
moves the burden of security processing from
the NP to the co-processor. The main limitation
of this method is the need for a packet to tra-
verse the memory many times. The communi-
cation between network processor and security
co-processors brings long delay. This makes
the network security performance depressed.
Therefore, finding new solutions that enhance
security processing in Ad hoc network is es-
sential. In fact, the security co-processor ex-
ecutes some types of algorithm for encryption
and decryption. While in Ad hoc network, in-
trusion detection method is better than tradi-
tional encryption, especially for some types of
DoS attacks, such as flooding attack. Because
most network processors use hardware multi-
thread architecture to fit multi-tasks in network
environment, we use one of the threads as se-
curity agent to do security computing, while
other threads do other network processing such
as packet forwarding. So the advantage of the
hardware multithread can be fully utilized with-
out using security co-processor. This solution
can save power consumption to meet the need
of wireless network.
5.1. NP-based Intrusion Detection
and Security Scheme
Lee’s distributed IDS for Ad hoc network is the
basic system model. The cost of intrusion detec-
tion increaseswith the number of nodes. Hierar-
chical IDS architecture is a model partitioned by
node space location. Multiple Sensors intrusion
detection system is a model partitioned by the
functions of intrusion detection sensor. AODV
routing protocol is an on-demand routing pro-
tocol, which initiates route discovery process
when needed. As we use one thread of NP as
security agent, and the thread owns dynamical
lifetime, agent-based dynamic lifetime security
scheme is proposed to improve the efficiency
of intrusion detection. It is an intrusion detec-
tion model firstly partitioned by route existent
lifetime. The number of IDS is equal to the
number of AODV RREQ-RREP stream. The
cost of intrusion detection decreases greatly.
The NP-based Ad hoc network architecture is
shown in Figure 3.
As seen in Figure 3, multithreading NP is used
to be a node of Ad hoc network. One thread of
NP is used as security agent. In artificial intelli-
gence context, agent is an entity that perceives
its environment with sensors, it acts on its en-
vironment with effectors [10]. Such an agent
can be a hardware multithread with sensors and
effectors. The agent is certain kinds of artificial
intelligence programs with user’s goal.
The thread has three states: ready, waiting and
running. The thread transforms its state by the
NP resource utilization and computing environ-
ment. The thread state transition diagram is
shown in Figure 4.
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Fig. 4. Thread state transition diagram.
The following programming section shows the
class definition of NP-based node:
Static class NP-node:
public wireless-node{
public: - - -;





The derivative relation of node class is shown
in Figure 5.
The thread is created as security agent by the
need of ADOV routing. Agent can change its
state to reflect the state of the ADOV routing
process. Security Agent is given dynamic life
to avoid being attacked. Security Agent not
only executes code and collects data, but also
has multi-timed states. Security agent can cre-
ate, execute, update and expire by the state of
RREQ-RREP stream. When there is RREQ-
RREP stream in network, there is a related se-
curity agent to monitor the stream by intrusion
detection algorithm. After the RREQ-RREP
Fig. 5. Derivative relation of node class.
stream disappears, the related security agent ex-
pires. Agent can update itself to improve trust-
worthiness and security. The timed finite state
machine of security Agent is shown in Figure 6.
Seen from Figure 6, security protocol detects
RREQ-RREP routing message periodically. If
any RREQ-RREP stream is detected, security
agent related to the stream is created to exe-
cute the intrusion detection algorithm. In fact,
it is the hardware thread to execute the secu-
rity code. After some interval, if the stream
already exists in network, the current agent mi-
grates to high trustworthiness neighbor node.
Then another thread in the neighbor node will
go on executing security code. So the intru-
sion detection algorithm is executed by many
high trustworthiness neighbors in turns to dis-
tribute the cost of security computing and avoid
the agent to be attacked. If there is no RREQ-
RREP stream in network for some interval, the
related agent expires by the stream. That is to
Fig. 6. The timed finite state machine of security Agent.









Packet format extension No need No need Need
Key management No need No need Need
Memory requirement Medium Medium Medium
Computation complexity Low Low High
Node Number to execute security scheme All nodes Part nodes Part nodes
Security scheme lifetime At all times On-demand At all times
Power dissipation Medium Low High
Ability to detect DoS attack Yes Yes No
Table 1. The comparison of the current security scheme in MANET.
say, the agent has dynamic lifetime to execute
the security scheme. The comparison of cur-
rent security scheme in MANET is listed in the
Table 1.
We make the following assumptions in the se-
curity scheme.
1) Agent is a hardware thread that executes the
security scheme. It can migrate between the
high trustworthiness nodes.
2) Agent has the ability to access routing tables
of nodes related to the stream. It should also
have the capability of controlling node and inter-
cepting RREQ and RREP related to the stream.
5.2. RREQ Flood Attack Detection
and Response
In AODV routing process, when a source node
needs a route to destination, it initiates a route
discovery process. In route discovery, a route
request can be uniquely identified by the RREQ
ID, source sequence, source and destination
route request address. In a route reply, reply
message goes back to the source node over the
shortest path. The routing information is stored
in a trace link list shown in Table 2. It includes
table head and table items. Every table head
stands for a route discovery entrance. RREQ-
Count stands for the number ofRREQbroadcast
in a period of time. It can be used to detect flood
attack. Every table item stands for a message in
the RREQ-RREP stream. Because the source
and destination IP address in RREP message is
reverse to the corresponding RREQ message,
a Tag flag is used to distinguish them. If it
is RREQ message, the Tag flag is 0; else it is
RREP message, the Tag flag is 1. The con-
struction of the trace link list is shown in Table
2.
The agent monitors the RREQ-RREP messages
at real-time to fill in the trace link list. In
NS2 simulator, the security agent monitors
the RREQ and RREP messages by calling
rece( ) function. Once the RREQ messages
are received, they will be processed by secu-
rity agent. The Agent exists with the stream.
After the RREQ-RREP stream disappears for
some interval, the Agent expires, but the link
list already exists in the node. RREQ flood
attack will be processed by the following algo-
rithm shown in Table 3.
When the Agent hears a RREQ message, it
firstly compares if the IP address in IP header
of the RREQ message is equal to AODV source
route address. If they are equal, it is a new
RREQ-RREP stream, the key information of
rreq src1 rreq dst1 rreq bid1 PREQCount1 source seq1 dest seq1 →
rreq src2 rreq dst2 rreq bid2 PREQCount2 source seq2 dest seq2 −→
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - −→
rreq srcn rreq dstn rreq bidn PREQCountN source seqN dest seqN −→
ipsrc1 ipdst1 Tag . . .
Table 2. The construction of the trace link list.
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1. Agent is created by a thread of NP.
The value of RREQ ID trace table head and the count of RREQ is set to zero. //Initiate the trace table
2. RREQ messages are received by agent and some useful information are extracted to be analyzed.
3. if(source route address of RREQ==source IP address of the message) // Judge if it is a new RREQ request
then {
Source and destination address of RREQ, broadcast ID and source sequence number are stored in a row
of the RREQ ID trace table head.
RREQCount⇓RREQCount+1. //Incrace the count of RREQ in an initial RREQ-RREP stream
if (RREQCount> threshold in an interval) then
{ RREQ flood is detected. //Judge the flood attack
The node that send the faked RREQ will be isolated from the network.
The node ID will be added to a blacklist . //Intrusion response
}
Else forward the RREQ normally //Normal route process
}
Else { agent adds the key information of the RREQ massage into the item of related link list.
forward the RREQ normally. }
Table 3. RREQ flood intrusion detection and response algorithm.
the RREQ message is saved in the head of the
link list to record the stream. If they are not
equal, the Agent looks up the head of link list
to validate if the related link list was built to
the stream. If the related head of the link list
is found, the Agent goes on to check the pre-
vious node to send the RREQ message. If the
previous node is found, the Agent validates the
data and directs consistency between the cur-
rent RREQ message and the RREQ message re-
ceived by previous node. The source sequence
number of the current RREQ message should
be equal to that of the RREQ message received
by previous node. The hop count should be in-
creased by 1. When all the above validation has
passed, the Agent adds the key information of
the RREQ message into the item of related link
list, the RREQ is forwarded correctly. Other-
wise fake RREQ attack is detected, the message
is dropped; the node to send the RREQ is iso-
lated and recorded into blacklist.
6. RREP Loop Attack Detection
and Response
The biggest difference between the intrusion de-
tection for RREQandRREP is in that the former
builds the link list, the latter checks and updates
the link list.
As Table 4 shows, theAgent monitors theRREP
at real-time to update the trace table, it detects
the route loop attack by RREP route loop detec-
tion algorithm and drops the malicious RREP
message.
When a RREP message is heard by Agent, it
checks the head of link list to validate if the
related link list was built to the RREQ-RREP
stream. If it finds the head related to the
stream, Agent goes on to find the correspond-
ing RREQ item and the previous node. If the
value of tag is more than 1, at the same time the
source-destination IP address in RREP is equal
1. RREP messages are received by agent and some useful information are extracted to be analyzed.
2. RREP messages are grouped by their RREP source and destination address.
3. if (one source IP address of RREP message == destination IP address of previous RREP message &&its
destination IP address of RREP == the source IP address of previous RREP message)
then
{ RREP route loop is detected. //Route loop detection
The malicious RREP message will be dropped.
The node ID relating to the malicious RREP message will be added to the blacklist.
//Intrusion response
}
else { Update the Tag value in the related item of trace link list.
forwarding the RREP normally. }
Table 4. RREP route loop detection and response algorithm.
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to destination-source IP address in the previ-
ous RREP, the RREP loop attack is detected.
When attacks are detected by agent, the RREP
is dropped, the malicious node is recorded into
blacklist.
7. Performance Evaluation and Simulation
Results
The measurements of the network performance
are made by the NS2 [11]. In order to validate
NP-based security scheme, we extend the node
type to multithreading architecture, it is real-
ized by node configure, we add multithreading
description to the node architecture. Table 5
shows the parameters used in our experiments.
Continuous bit rate (CBR) is used in our ex-
periments. There are 20 nodes in the Ad hoc
network. The simulation runs for 300 seconds.
The field configuration is 1 000 m×600m. The
physical link bandwidth is 2 Mbps. The node
architecture is multithreading.
Communication Type CBR
Number of Nodes 20
Node architecture multithreading
Simulation Area 1000m*600m
Simulation Time 300 seconds
Pause Time 2 seconds
Packet Rate 4packets/second
Number of Connections 5
Transmission Range 250m
Physical Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Number of malicious nodes 1
Table 5. Simulation parameters.
DoS attacks in AODVprotocol routing level can
be classified into RREQ flood attack and RREP
route loop attack. Performance evaluation to the
two types of DoS attacks are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 7 shows that the two types of DoS attacks
have great effect on the performance, while
NP-based security scheme can effectively de-
tect the attacks and block the attackers. Seen
from Figure 7a), packet delivery ratio in nor-
mal is 100%; under RREQ flood attack, the
a) RREQ flood attack and defense.
b) RREQ flood attack and defense.
c) RREP route loop attack and defense.
d) RREP route loop attack and defense.
Fig. 7. Performance evaluation of NP-based dynamic
lifetime security scheme.
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metric decreases to 47% while under security
scheme, the malicious node is detected and iso-
lated, the metric recovers to 98%, it is near
to the normal level. Seen from Figure 7b),
the ratio RREQCount/RREPCount in normal
is 2848/86=33, the ratio value under attack
increases to 250059/332=751, while the ra-
tio value under NP-based security scheme de-
creases to 6208/159=39. Agent-NP security
scheme can detect the RREQ flood attack on
time, yet there is little influence at the begin-
ning of attack.
In route loop attack, the packet delivery ratio
greatly decreases from 100% to 1.1%, while the
ratio value increases to 100% under NP-based
security scheme as shown in Figure 7c). For-
wardCount – the number of forwarded packet in
normal is 1117, it greatly increases to 10491 in
attack, while it decreases to 1143 in NP-based
security scheme. As shown in Figure 7d), when
the malicious RREP message is dropped, the
route loop disappears, so the performance re-
sumes near normal level. Simulation results
show that the security scheme is most effective
with the two types of DoS attacks.
To research the effect of number of nodes and
packet rate on security scheme, we change the
number of nodes and packet rate to analyse the
result. The parameters can be easily changed in
NS2 simulator.
When the number of nodes is increased to 40,
packet delivery ratio under attack is 59%, it is
more than the ratio in node number 20;while the
metric increases to 96% in my security scheme.
Since AODV is an on-demand routing protocol,
it is sensitive to this metric, my security scheme
is efficient to DoS attack.
When packet rate is increased to 8packets/second,
the ratio RREQCount/RREPCount under at-
tack is 391559/473=823, while the metric de-
creases to 8673/223=39 inmy security scheme.
It shows that the scheme is efficient.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, DoS attacks for AODV routing
protocol are classified and analyzed. A novel
intrusion detection scheme based on NP is pro-
posed to combat the attacks. It is an intru-
sion detection and response model firstly par-
titioned by the route existent lifetime. A hard-
ware thread in NP acts as security agent to ex-
ecute intrusion detection and response. The se-
curityAgent can change its statewith theAODV
routing process to save energy. The Agent can
update itself to a higher trustworthiness neigh-
bor to keep the high trustworthiness of network.
The number of Agents is equal to that of RREQ-
RREP stream. The Agent can build and up-
date link list to trace the RREQ-RREP message
stream.
Simulation results show that the attacks have
great effect on the system performance. NP-
based dynamic lifetime security scheme can ef-
ficiently detect the attacks and isolate the ma-
licious node to make the network security per-
formance metric recover to normal quickly. In
the future, Intel IXP 425 Network Processor
will be used as process core to establish Secu-
rity Association in MANET. The research about
the attack and security scheme for AODV pro-
tocol is meaningful to Ad hoc network security
and future application.
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